Milosevic came to power (1987-9) on waves of popular support for his
rabid nationalism and fake anti-establishment credentials. His first
actions were directed at the Kosovo Albanians. He revoked their
autonomy by altering the constitution. He demolished the educational
and legal infrastructure of the region. And he applied bloody force
to suppress street protests.
Combined with the IMF's pressure to repay maturing loans - the other
republic watched the phoenix of Serb dominion with horror and
indignation. Kosovo was the undoing of Yugoslavia a few times over
its long history - and it proved up to its historical reputation.
Hitherto fringe nationalist parties emerged as viable alternatives
in both Slovenia and Croatia as a direct result of the suppression
of Kosovo. The 1990 "shock therapy" (composed of a wage freeze and a
hike in the general price level), the cutoff of American aid pending
republic-specific elections and the populist, grievances-orientated
electoral campaigns that ensued - sealed Yugoslavia's fate.
When Franjo Tudjman won the elections and a May 1991 plebiscite on a
neo-Ustashe platform and symbols, with a two thirds majority, the
Serbs prepared for war. They cordoned off their regions and refused
to allow ballot boxes in. They began to arm (the JNA was helpful in
this) and they teamed up with Milosevic who had his own Great Serbia
(and even greater personal profit) in mind.
The US - as it is wont to do - inadvertently stoked the flames but
pleading with all parties to maintain "territorial integrity". This
conflicted directly with both German views on the matter and with
weighty German investments in the region. It urged the EU to
recognize the breakaway republics. It would not be the last time the
West spoke in (at least) two voices.
Technically, the Serbs started the war everywhere.
13. The Serbs Started It all
The JNA invaded Slovenia immediately after it declared its
independence (only to suffer heavy and disgracing losses at the hand
of hastily organized militias). The Serbs in Kraijna expelled their
Croat neighbours having declared independence. The JNA invaded
eastern Croatia. Serb artilery demolished Vukovar. These were
undoubtedly the first acts of war.
But atrocities against both warriors and civilians were commited by
all parties involved. Serbs, Croats and Moslem Bosnians all engaged
in mass expulsions, slaughter, rape and mass executions with
fervour, zeal and glee. The Serb did so more visibly and, perhaps,
more numerously. But the guilt is shared. The demonization of the
Serbs only served to alienate them further and enhanced their
paranoiac seige mentality. It was not conducive to making peace and
it might have prolonged the war unnecessarily.
14. The West Acted too Late and too Hesitatingly
The West may have acted ignorantly - but definitely not too late or
too hesitatingly once the war started. The European Community held a
peace conference in the Hague as early as September 1991. It failed
because Milosevic insisted on a Greater Serbia dream. With the
entire might of the JNA behind him ,he might have felt invincible.
Then, between October 1991 and February 1992, international
mediators, both European and American secured 15 (!) ceasefires,
none of them too effective, admittedly. The last one, organized by
the eminence grise Cyrus Vance involved UN troops.
Unfortunately, these valiant efforts were coupled with some pretty
dumb moves such as recognizing Croatia in December 1991 and thus
incensing Serbia to insanity. This was German finesse at its apex.
In June 1992 this insult was coupled to the injury of a UN imposed
unilateral embargo on Serbia (though an arms embargo applied to all
parties equally - thus preserving Serb superiority in weapons).
15. The Bosnians were the Fiercest Enemies of the Serbs and Serbia
Suffered Its Worst Defeat There
When it all began, the Bosnians actually opted to remain within a
Yugoslav Federation. They were the only ones - together with
Macedonia - who seemed to have no design on independence.
Negotiations commenced between Belgrade, the local Serbs, the
Muslims and the Croats. These negotiations were interrupted by a
referendum in which Muslim and Croat Bosnians voted for secession
while the Serbs abstained en masse. The leadership of Bosnia did not
want to hold the plebiscite. It was forced to do in emulation of
Croatia and Slovenia and in response to the growing rumble of street
protest. The lines of the emerging war coalitions have emerged
clearly. Izetbegovic's first post election government actually
included Serbs. But Milosevic was fanning the flames. He regarded
Bosnia as easy prey and an integral part of Serbia and he intended
to use the local Serb populace as pawns on his ever more bloodied
board. Izetbegovic's Muslim-nationalist past did not help.
The Serbs clearly won the ensuing war. They controlled an ethnically
cleansed swathe of Bosnia equal to 70% of its surface area.
Moreover, they linked to Serb-dominated zones in Croatia. And the
West (notably, President Bush) seemed to acquiesce despite Serb
atrocities commited in dedicated rape camps and execution sites. The
army of the emerging Republika Srpska incorporated JNA units,
replete with their heavy armour. They were supported with food and
supplies from Belgrade.
Even Mate Boban's Croat forces did not succeed to reverse this
uninterrupted streak of luck and success. They fought a few
successful but rather meaningless battles before the imposition of
the Vance-Owen partition Peace Plan was introduced and accepted by
them and by the Muslims. The Serbs rejected it in their makeshift
parliament.
And then the Croats turned on their Muslim collaborators in places
like Mostar. They hoped to secure a larger Croat space and the Serbs
seemed to comply by standing aside. Conspiracy theories abounded
among the Muslims but the reality was a division of Bosnia between
Serbs and Croats, even as fighting broke out between the compatriots
of these new-found allies on Croatian soil.
16. The War Brought to Power the Most Extremist and Radical Leaders
in Each of the Countries Involved
Milosevic was not the most radical Serb politician. He was very
often criticized by the likes of Vojaslav Seselj for betraying the
Serb cause. Extremist parties won handsomely in Serb elections and
held many seats in the national parliament of Serbia. The same can
be said about Croatia. Franjo Tudjman - while an authoritarian
Ustashe sympathizer - was nowhere near the neo-Nazi nostalgia of
Dobroslav Paraga. Both Seselj and Paraga had their own para-military
formations which fought each other in Bosnia.
Izetbegovic did publish an "Islamic Declaration" (for which he was
jailed in 1983) - but he also was no Moslim fanatic or
fundamentalist.
All sides were bound by shady dealings in drugs and weapons. The
real conviction and vocation of all the leaders of the region was -
and still is - crime.
17. The Kosovo Conflict was a Direct Result of Serb Suppression
In general, this is true. The Albanian population - especially the
young and the educated - felt at a deadend. But the direct trigger
was the fact that the Dayton accord which regulated the relationship
between Yugoslavia (Serbia), Croatia and Bosnia - failed to mention
Kosovo even once, let alone relate to its specific problems.
Pacifists and pro-Westerners like Ibrahim Rugova lost their clout
and authority overnight. The resulting vacuum was filled by the KLA - a guerilla cum drugs group which embarked upon the path of armed
resistance by killing policemen and blowing up their police stations
all over Kosovo. There is no doubt who started the Kosovo ball
rolling, technically speaking. But one must never forget that it
Serb oppression that led to the formation of the KLA in the first
place. The Serbs retaliated by torturing and "disappearing" Albanian
prisoners. Following an attack by the KLA in February 1998 (in which
4 officers died) - the Serbs embarked on a scorched earth and ethnic
cleansing policy. The rest is history.
18. The Rambouillet Accord
Not a myth this time. It called for Serb capitulation on various
issues including free passage in Serbia of foreign soldiers and
airborne vehicles and a referendum to decide the secession of Kosovo
in three years time. Milosevic could have never accepted this. The
West knew it but believed that he will surrender to a threat of
force - the same force used in Bosnia in 1994-5. The West was wrong.